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Abbreviations used in the text 
 
ABiH Armija Bosne i Hercegovine (Army of Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
BiH   Bosna i Hercegovina (Bosnia and Herzegovina) 
HDZ   Hrvatska demokratska zajednica (Croatian Democratic Union) 
HVO Hrvatsko vijeće obrane (Croatian Defence Council) 
HR HB Hrvatska Republika Herceg-Bosna (Croatian Community of 
Herceg-Bosna, 1993-1996) 
HZ HB Hrvatska zajednica Herceg-Bosna (Croatian Community of 
Herceg-Bosna, 1991-1993)  
JNA Jugoslavenska narodna armija (Yugoslav peopleʼs army) 
RS Republika Srpska (The Serb Republic in BiH, 1992- ) 
RSK Republika Srpska Krajina (Republic of Serbian Krajina, 1990-
1995) 
SDA Stranka Demokratske Akcije (Party of Democratic Action) 
SDS Srpska Demokratska Stranka (Serbian Democratic Party in BiH) 
SR BiH Socijalistička Republika Bosna i Hercegovina (Socialist 
Republic of BiH, 1943-1992) 
UJDI Udruženje za jugoslavensku demokratsku inicijativu 
(Association for Yugoslav Democratic Initiative) 





The latest war in Croatia and BiH has produced a multitude of scholarly, 
semi-scholarly, autobiographical and journalistic works. Only a very small 
number of these works meet the requirements of modern historical science, 
while the majority are attempts to achieve personal political aims under 
false academic pretense. Also, participants of the war have attempted, 
through their own literary works, to present themselves in a more positive 
light or explain how they were right but were not listened to which led to 
todayʼs results that are worse than expected. A separate group consists of 
non-Yugoslav authors, usually poorly familiar with the topics as well as 
with the languages of the studied area. These are mostly people who have 
spent some time in Belgrade or Sarajevo where they gained acquaintances, 
as for example, David Gibbs, Robert Donia, John Fine, etc. They usually 
produce some kind of colonial discourse regarding peoples of the former 
Yugoslavia, i.e. how they have ‘ancient hatreds’ or of their prewar unity, 
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how they were not wise enough to choose the right choice at the first 
democratic elections etc. Exceptions to this can be discerned in the likes of 
James Gow and Michael Mann, whose works, however, also include a 
noticeable lack of ʻlocal knowledgeʼ.1 An interesting development was the 
growth of scientific papers on the Serbs starting immediately before and 
continuing after the NATO intervention on Kosovo in 1999, which 
evidently was meant to serve as part of a legitimation process.  
This article will present a personal view of the key events of the war 
that was waged on Croatian and Bosnian-Herzegovinian territory, with 
special attention paid to peace plans led under the aegis of the international 
community. In considering these plans I will present the changes they 
brought to the field, and what each plan offered to all sides, but also the 
reasons for their general failure. However, it is important to bear in mind 
that the outlined picture is primarily based on the current level of 
knowledge, which could experience a drastic change in the future when the 
official archives of all sides are opened. 
 
Global change and the role of Yugoslavia 
The late 1980s of the twentieth century brought about notable global 
changes and subsequently the collapse of Communist systems. Significant 
changes also affected the European Community, todayʼs European Union. 
Leading countries started establishing tighter co-operation, and the 
possibility of expanding the Union was growing stronger as an idea. 
Although it was the main potential entrant, Yugoslavia did not join the EC, 
having, as it did, preconditions to complete such reforms as political and 
cultural democratization and introducing the market economy system.2 
Besides, democratic elections were also a precondition for receiving the 
loans Yugoslavia had been given since the start of the 1980s.3 
The first democratic elections held in Yugoslavia in 1990 resulted in 
winning campaigns by democratic national parties, except in Serbia where 
the Communists led by Slobodan Milošević maintained their lead. It appears 
that the leading countries of the European Community, namely Great 
Britain, laid too much hope in the reformed Communists led by Ante 
Marković and the Democratic Alternative (Demokratska alternativa) led by 
                                                          
1 An excellent essay of the same name on ʻlocal knowledgeʼ can be found in Geertz (1983).  
2 Miškulin (2010): 299-301. 
3 Bekić (2010): 340. 
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Adil Zulfikarpašić, Desimir Tošić and Vane Ivanović, who were expected to 
reform Yugoslavia into a state acceptable to the European Community. This 
preceded the actions of Communist intellectuals and employees, who 
founded the UJDI in 1989. Distinguished members included the likes of 
Branko Horvat, Žarko Puhovski, Milorad Pupovac, Koča Popović, Ljubomir 
Tadić, Nenad Zakošek, Mirjana Kasapović and Milan Kangrga.4 In 1990 
Žarko Puhovski published the book Socijalistička konstrukcija zbilje 
(Socialist Construction of Reality), which, in the last chapter, included a 
potential plan for a future state structure, whereby decisions would be made 
by citizens (not by the state) and important topics would be dealt with 
through referendums. Since no specific stress was placed on protecting 
minority rights, it could be presumed that such a system (and the rest of its 
sort) would pander to the most numerous ʻcitizensʼ. Furthermore, Puhovski 
was stunned by the citizens’ commitment to the ʻprimitiveʼ HDZ at the first 
democratic elections, contrary to voting in favor of the intellectuals 
(presumably UJDI members) and the program presented in his work.5 
This period was significantly affected by the turnaround in American 
politics, since the USA wanted to reduce its military obligations in Europe 
after the Cold War, but also retain its influence. This meant that the USA 
would not interfere in European security issues unless it was part of some 
direct interest, which was  visible during the obstruction of the Vance-Owen 
peace plan. By the end of the Cold War, Yugoslavia had lost its significant  
strategic position of a ʻbuffer-zoneʼ between the East and the West, and was 
transformed into a guinea-pig, in other words, a training ground for 
American diplomatic experiments.6 
 
Nation-forming, political experience and the creation of the Yugoslavias 
Michael Mann separates four sources of power: ideological, economic, 
military and political. The ideological source refers to the mobilization of 
social values, norms and rituals of peoples and societies. Military power is a 
socially organized, congested and lethal form of violence. Political power 
refers to a centralized and territorial regulation of social life, essentially 
                                                          
4 Orlić (2011): 101. This article does not tell the reader much about the stateʼs problems from the 
title and summary, but is instead full of the authorʼs regret because of the UJDIʼs failure. 
Furthermore, the author does not understand the main point of Michael Mannʼs book or she has 
not read it, Orlić (2011): 110. 
5 Puhovski (1990); for the mental set of Milan Kangrga see the excellent article by Lučić (2005a). 
6 Gow (1997): 29-30. 
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being authoritarian and monopolistic.7 Before the first democratic elections 
in Yugoslavia, all four power sources were more or less in the hands of the 
Communist Party or under its control (monopoly). The elections initiated 
the redistribution and dispersal of this power. The war in ex-Yugoslavia was 
essentially a clash between the ʻAll Serbs in One Countryʼ Serbian project 
and its opponents, primarily consisting of Croats in Croatia, Bosnia and  
Herzegovina, Bosniaks8 and Kosovo Albanians.  
When considering the downfall of Yugoslavia a question arises: what 
are states? What is their point? Pre-modern states were static, possible to 
sustain by force, while modern countries tend toward a voluntary consent of 
the people rather than coercion. Both Yugoslavias, the second less than the 
first, were primarily a tool of the Serbian political elite, but also of others to 
a lesser extent, and used to carry out their own economic and political 
interests. The first Yugoslavia (1918-1941) was created out of almost 
completely formed nations, which had diverse political experiences and 
cultures. Of all the Yugoslav nations, the loudest political demands were 
made by either the Croats or Slovenians. 
The Yugoslav political centre reckoned that the Yugoslav nations 
should and could be assimilated to a new Yugoslav nation. The creation of 
this nation was to be achieved through school-systems, but also repression if 
necessary. Examples of this kind are known from the 19th century, but in the 
20th century this type of assimilation became unsustainable due to the final 
phase of nation forming. Contrary to this, the second Yugoslavia, according 
to Communist practice, was impregnated with the opinion that nations were 
slowly disappearing. A clear example of this opinion is the relatively recent 
work of Dejan Jović, who is still surprised by the fact that nations have not 
yet vanished.9 Both of the Yugoslav states neglected the importance of 
nations. Individuals use nationality to perceive their moral obligations, 
believing that as members of an (imagined) community they are entitled to 
group solidarity. Nations are not seeking secession from themselves. The 
impossibility of creating a unified Yugoslav nation caused and deepened 
                                                          
7 Mann (2005): 30-32. 
8 The Bosniaks is current ethnic designation for Bosnian Muslims, which was officially used after 
1993. The paper will refer to the (Bosnian) Muslims before 1993 and the Bosniaks after 1993, 
understanding the same people.   
9 Jović (2003). 




Western studies of nations and nationalism lost their importance in the 
1980s due to the opinion that the role of nations was growing weak. Re-
interest in nations and nationalism reappeared in the early 1990s, only after 
significant international conflicts. Unlike Western intellectuals who were 
directed toward social studies, the then Croatian historian and dissident 
Franjo Tuđman warned in his book from 1981 that solving the question of 
nations was the crucial element for any modern state to function properly.11 
So far, nationalism appears to be the most successful movement in 
achieving integration compared to all other ideologies.12 
 
Were the Yugoslavias sustainable? 
Compared with the above, it is clear that the odds for conserving the 
Yugoslavias were extremely poor. Nations were not willing to compromise 
with other nations about the redistribution of already limited resources. This 
became visible during the Axis attack on the Kingdom of Yugoslavia when 
some of its citizens refused to defend it, joining the German forces instead. 
An important factor in the breakdown of socialist Yugoslavia were the 
changes in personnel Josip Broz made in the 1970s. From the Second World 
War up until the 1970s, Broz removed most of his closest political 
associates, and replaced them with new – thus carrying out a negative 
selection. The same group continued to rule Yugoslavia after Broz had died, 
without having the necessary skills and knowledge to sustain a complex 
multinational country. The only way of sustaining Yugoslavia, (though this 
did not necessarily guarantee success), was finding a charismatic heir for 
Broz who would govern like his predecessor.13 
Since the 1960s, the Serbs have experienced a demographic drop, 
primarily in Kosovo which became a precondition for conflict. The 
economic crisis in the 1980s led to a hard struggle for already insufficient 
resources. The control of these resources was possible only under the 
condition of federal control, which led to control of the republics and that of 
local government. Federal control enabled arbitrary redistributions and the 
installation of politically suitable people in important positions. Due to 
                                                          
10 Schöpflin (2000): 324-43. 
11 F. Tuđman (1981). 
12 M. Tuđman (2012): 201. 
13 Schöpflin (2000): 337. 
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insufficient resources, at least one group was expected to face losses. This is 
why the Serbs were against decentralization which was favored by the 
Slovenes and Croats. Nationalist parties won the elections in these republics 
because they asserted that the ʻnational wealthʼ belonged to the people, in 
other words, the redistribution which they advocated was more important 
than political power. An ideal denouement for the Serbs was a strong 
centralized federation, which they would control and also redistribute all of 
its resources. A back-up plan was the creation of a Greater Serbia, with a 
loyal leadership in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina.14 An interesting 
article to single-out in this context is one by Nina Caspersen on the relations 
of Beograd with Knin and Pale (political centres of RSK and RS), in which 
the author makes sources out of her own interviews with  instigators of the 
Serbian rebellion in Croatia and BiH which she conducted in 2003. The 
most interesting person in the interviews is definitely leader of the Serbs in 
Eastern Slavonia - Goran Hadžić.15 
Practice has shown that is hard to sustain a country under international 
stress if it lacks domestic legitimation and if there is no voluntary consent 
on part of the demos.16 This is best shown in the political situation in todayʼs 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was created and remains sustainable almost 
only thanks to international pressure and support. 
 
An overview of the nature of the war 
The start of the war in Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina had similar 
features. Firstly, local Serbs would occupy an area, which would lead to the 
JNA separating the conflicting sides, which in practice meant a confirmation 
of Serbian conquests, and creating the so-called ʻbuffer zonesʼ. When local 
Serbs failed in seizing territory, generally larger cities, the JNA would 
surround the cities and attack them with the aim of intimidating and 
expelling the population. This demonstrative type of violence was meant to 
force the population to leave without a struggle, due to the fact that the JNA 
did not have enough men for street combat, a vital factor for seizing cities, 
but merely artillery. Another advantage of expelling the population was the 
inability to wage a potential guerilla war from within.17 The JNAʼs dread of 
                                                          
14 Mann (2005): 363-67. 
15 Caspersen (2007). 
16 Schöpflin (2000): 342. 
17 Gow (1997): 41. 
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guerrila warfare was visible at the end of 1991, when it stopped advancing 
and engaged forces to cleanse the rest of the occupied areas in Croatia. 
Since cities under siege were easier to defend, and capturing these cities 
came at the price of a large number of dead and wounded, street warfare 
was left to the Serb militia.18 
The purpose of leading such a limited war was to force the other side 
to retreat, rather than to expand the conflict.19 The unreadiness of the 
conflicting sides to sustain great mortality led to the creation of forced 
strategies. This meant avoiding direct combat whenever possible. The aim 
of coercion was to influence the other sidesʼ conduct through posing threats 
in order to change the previous conduct. In the case of disregarding the 
threats, the other side would be exposed to a punishment which would 
probably be better to avoid. However, the punishment would need to be 
appropriate, so that the enforcers were satisfied, and not discontented.20 The 
question remains as to whether  the JNA could have managed to intersect 
Croatia as they planned without applying the given strategy, but instead 
leaving major cities under siege and then continuing to advance. 
 
The Vance Plan and the international recognition of Croatia: From 
agression to international recognition 
The first trace of the implementation of the Serbian project can be seen in 
the plan of proclaiming the federal unit of Srpska Krajina in Knin in 1989, 
during the celebration of the Battle of Kosovo, planned by the Initial Serb 
Committee from northern Dalmatia, Lika, Kordun, Banija, Slavonia and 
Baranja, which was stopped by extinguishing the sound system.21 
The events which marked the beginning of tensions in May 1990 were 
the following: disarming the Croatian military reserve, enactment of new 
amendments in the Croatian Constitution, the staged assassination of 
Miroslav Mlinar, the withdrawal of the Knin municipality from the 
Municipality Communities of Dalmatia and the clash at a football match 
between Dinamo Zagreb and  Belgradeʼs Red Star. The foremost issues with 
the newly made amendments was in particular the question of Serbian 
constitutionality, which changed the status of Serbs in Croatia from a 
                                                          
18 Gow (2003): 161. 
19 Marijan (2008); Gow (2003): 300. 
20 Gow (1997): 39. 
21 Barić (2005): 50. 
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constitutional nation to a national minority, listed with other minorities. 
The problem of the aforementioned ʻlocal knowledgeʼ is visible in the 
works of James Gow and Michael Mann in that they both stress the firing of 
policemen of Serbian nationality as one of the main causes of the Serbian 
rebellion in Croatia. On July 3 1990, members of the Public Safety Station 
Knin sent a letter to the Secretary of the federal police Petar Gračanin, in 
which they stressed that the Croatian government was relieving Serbian 
police officers and that they did not want new uniforms or changing the 
name of the police forces from communist milicija to Croatian redarstvo 
(police) due to its similarity to the NDH (Independent State of Croatia, 
1941-1945) nomenclature. The redarstvo was never officially announced, 
and new uniforms came into use only at the end of 1991. Two days later 
Croatian interior minister Boljkovac met with the signatories of the letter in 
Knin, who requested the establishment  of a municipal station, which in 
practice would have meant an independent militia which the central 
government would have no control over.22 In early 1991 the police forces of 
RSK were founded. The government in Zagreb requested the signing of an 
oath of loyalty to the Republic of Croatia. Rejection would mean a 
suspension  of employment, which was interpreted by the Serbian leadership 
as a provocation. These new circumstances required a new repressive 
system which would fulfill the governmentʼs wishes. The authorities placed 
trustworthy people in crucial positions, while the changes made primarily 
affected the Serbs due to the fact that they formed the majority in the 
repressive apparatus.23 Taking the above into consideration, it seems that 
relieving the Serbian policemen was not the start of the armed rebellion, but 
rather the unwillingness of all policemen, regardless of nationality, to serve 
the central authority. The key problem was that the Serbs, who were over-
represented in the communist-era Croatian police forces, compared with 
their percentage of the population,24 felt that they were losing the privilege 
of control and handling of the repressive apparatus. 
In addition, by the end of June Borisav Jović and Slobodan Milošević 
were planning to use the JNA to force Croats and Slovenes to separate, with 
the condition that the Serbs in Croatia carry out a referendum to determine 
                                                          
22 Barić (2005): 68. 
23 Barić (2005): 126-27. 
24 In 1984 the Serbs constituted 49% of police officers in Croatia, although in the 1981 census the 
Serbs constitued only 11.55% of the Croatian population, see Štulhofer (1993). 
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the borders. The Serbs held a Serbian assembly in Srb on July 25, which 
proclaimed the ʻDeclaration of independence and autonomy of the Serbian 
peopleʼ. The main argument stressed in the Declaration was that the 
privilege of independence should be given to nations, and not republics.25 
According to the Constitution of socialist Croatia, Croatia was “… the 
national state of the Croatian people, the state of the Serbian people in 
Croatia, and the state of other peoples and nationalities who live in it.”26 
The meaning of Communist constitutions was symbolic and intentionally 
written to be manipulated, and needs to be distinguished from democratic 
constitutions, it is also clear that Serbs were not granted constitutionality. 
They would have possessed constitutionality if it had been written that 
Croatia was the national state of the Serbian people in Croatia. Therefore, if 
the new Croatian Constitution abolished the constitutionality of the Serbs, it 
also abolished the constitutionality of other nations as well. This 
formulation of the Constitution was only meant to emphasise the special 
position of the Serbian people in Croatia who were larger in number 
compared to other minorities. 
Shortly after this, on August 17, 1990, the police in Zadar took away 
70 rifles from the police station in Benkovac, while on the same day in 
Obrovac and Knin arms of the reserve police were distributed to Serbian 
rebels. The Croatian police in Zagreb was instructed to deal with the 
situation with helicopters and transporters. The JNA stopped the helicopters, 
and the Serbian population in Titova Korenica stopped the transporters. That 
the rebellion and the JNAʼs interference was planned earlier is clearly 
visible in the fact that two months earlier the 221st Motorized Brigade of the 
Knin Army Corps had its classification brought to level B (15-60% 
capacity), and was reinforced with two batallions of A classification (60-
100% capacity).27 
The Serbian referendum of autonomy was carried out from August 19 
to September 2, and on September 30 autonomy was proclaimed with 
99.96% of the voters approving. Taking into consideration that the voting 
was not completely regular, as well as the media war that was waged  
against the Croatian government, it is still clear that the Serbian people did 
not want to live in any kind of Croatia. A significant statement on this 
                                                          
25 Barić (2005): 72. 
26 Yugoslav constitution (1974): 242. 
27 Barić (2005): 78-80. 
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question was made by Milan Babić in 1991: “I assure you that we in 
Krajina would rather die or depart from Krajina to Europe, than to agree to 
any kind of living in any kind of Croatian state.” It seems very likely the 
mass departure of the Serbs in 1995 during Croatian military operations was 
planned by the Serbian government with a yet unknown goal in mind. The 
probable answer is that the Serbian government wanted to damage the 
reputation of Croatia in the eyes of the international community and move 
the refugees to Kosovo in order to increase the Serbian demographic rate. 
In early March 1991, an armed revolt broke out in Pakrac, which led 
to the intervention of the JNA, separating the local Serbs and the Croatian 
police, enabling the local Serbs to retreat. Pakrac was the first place to 
witness the JNAʼs role as a ʻbuffer-zoneʼ. Preventing the Croatian police 
from entering the territory under armed siege with closed roads, the JNA 
secured the better organization of the local Serbs and basically gave them 
protection.28 A week after this, demonstrations broke out in Belgrade against 
Milošević and the ruling structures. The opposition resented Miloševićʼs 
poor care for Serbs outside of Serbia.29 On March 21, local Serbs occupied 
the Bureau of the National Park Plitvička Jezera. Croatian police arrived to 
intervene, and again the JNA appeared as a ʻbuffer-zoneʼ. At the Plitvice 
Lakes the first Croatian victim fell –  the police officer Josip Jović. In May, 
the Croatian village of Kijevo was attacked and 12 police officers were 
killed in Borovo Selo. 
 
From declaring independence to the acceptance of the Vance Plan as a 
precondition for international recognition 
On June 25, the Croatian Parliament proclaimed the sovereignty and 
independence of the Republic of Croatia. By mediation of the international 
community, specifically the European Triplet for Antiwar Actions,30 on July 
8 on the Brijuni Islands, a three-month moratorium was proclaimed on the 
independence. In practice this enabled the JNA and Croatian Serbs to 
continue the plans for the last attempt at salvaging Yugoslavia. Croatian 
authorities desired the immediate dispatching of international observers 
                                                          
28 Marijan (2008):  57-58. 
29 Lučić (2008): 120. 
30 The Triplet consisted of ministers of foregin affairs from past, present and future chairs of  the 
European Community. In the begining the Triplet was led by Italy, Netherlands and 
Luxembourg. Italy was later succeeded by Portugal. 
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which was opposed by the federal Yugoslav authorities. The observersʼ 
mission arrived in Croatia at the beginning of July, but they stressed that 
their authority merely applied to Slovenia. This standpoint changed only at 
the end of July, when Croatia became part of their mission. The Federal 
authorities created problems with regard to the observers, delaying their 
dispatch as much as possible. After a few failed initiatives, an ultimatum 
was handed to all sides to agree to given conditions by September 1. The 
mission started its operations on the field with a civil character although 
Croatian authorities also sought a military character.31 Besides their official 
work, the observers carried out intelligence work for their home countries as 
well. 
The last attempt at stopping Croatian independence was the bombing 
of the official residence of the Croatian government, Banski Dvori, by the 
JNA, on October 7, 1991, after the expiry of the three-month moratorium. 
Croatian President Franjo Tuđman, President of the Federal Presidency 
Stjepan Mesić and Federal Prime Minister Ante Marković left the scene a 
few minutes earlier and thus avoided assassination. The next day 
independence was proclaimed by the Croatian Parliament. The Croatian 
government wanted to gain international recognition as soon as possible and 
secure the arrival of the UN Peace Corps. In Paris, on October 11, 
representatives of the European Community offered the Serbs autonomy in 
Croatia and stressed that Croatia would soon be internationally recognized, 
which they refused immediately.32 The Serbian government and the JNA 
wanted to conquer the planned areas and only after that secure the arrival of 
the UN Peace Corps. The Croatian government, however, started a series of 
successful military operations, which resulted in recovery of parts of 
Bilogora and west Slavonia. In Geneva, on November 23, a cease-fire and 
the raising of the blockade of barracks was signed by the Presidency of 
Yugoslavia, Croatia and the JNA, which was meant to enable the departure 
of the JNA as one of the preconditions for the arrival of the Peace Corps.  
Since the beginning of the conflicts on the territory of former 
Yugoslavia, the main disagreement was the question of the right of 
separation – was it the right of a nation or a federal republic? The inability 
of conducting sovereignty over its entire territory was the main problem for 
                                                          
31 For more information on the observersʼ mission see Miškulin (2010). 
32 Barić (2008): 68. 
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Croatia. In normal circumstances, a government can justify almost any 
operation of conducting its sovereign rights. A sovereign authority is an 
ultimate one which can not be overruled or rejected.33 Sovereignty has to be 
achieved through armed force, but also sustained in the case of individual 
rebel activity.34 Accordingly, the Croatian government did not have full, but 
limited, sovereignty because it was not able to control its whole territory or 
to quash the rebellion by negotiation or by force. 
Due to the disagreement of the main participants, The Ministersʼ 
Council of the European Community decided to form an Arbitration 
Commission which would investigate  the problem, popularly named the 
Badinter Commission after its president Robert Badinter who was the 
president of the Constitutional Court of France. Even though the 
commission consisted of five High Court judges (Italy, Germany, France, 
Spain and Belgium), the main negotiations were held between Germany and 
France, that is between the chancellor Helmut Kohl and the minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher, on the one hand, and the French 
president Francois Mitterand and the Foreign Affair minister Roland Dumas 
on the other. Germany favored the recognition of the newly-founded 
republics of Croatia and Slovenia to prevent further warfare, while France 
and Great Britain claimed that premature recognition would only enhance 
the conflict. 
At the same time, under the influence of Great Britain, the Peace 
Conference on Yugoslavia was convoked under the presidency of Lord 
Peter Carrington, a highly esteemed diplomat who had enjoyed high 
positions such as the British Secretary of State for Defence (1970-1974) and 
Secretary of State for Foreign nad Commonwealth Affairs (1979-1982), 
Secretary General of NATO (1984-1988) and the Chair of of the Lancaster 
House Conference, which solved problems in Rhodesia and enabled its 
transformation into Zimbabwe. The Peace Conferenceʼs tactic was, as Lord 
Carrington himself stressed, to shape the conduct of the conflicting sides by 
blackmailing them with international recognition through the ʻstick and 
carrotʼ system. Besides, they founded several ineffective work-groups. 
Germany played a major role with its lobbying for Croatia and therefore 
ʻconfoundedʼ the Peace Conferenceʼs plans. After the recognition of 
                                                          
33 Gow (1997): 68-69. 
34 Gow (1994): 476. 
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Croatia, the Conference blamed Germany for the extension of the war due to 
premature recognition. 
The German instance of the unilateral recognition of Croatia is an 
exception in international relations. In practice, only states which possess 
complete rule over their territory are recognised, and after being given 
approval by a majority of countries in the international community. One of 
the causes of Germanyʼs behaviour was surely its desire to show its 
international status, and the intrepidity in making unilateral decisions, 
without fearing potential sanctions or isolation.35 An important role was also 
played by the German fear of a wave of refugees which was a potential 
threat for the country. 
It is important to point out that in peace mediations the main goal is to 
fulfill the interests of the ones who are mediating, and only after that, the 
interests of the conflicting sides.36 The international community had 
different interests, on one side the German and Austrian, and on the other 
French and British interests. However, good mutual relations were more 
important to them than their stance towards Yugoslavia. The truncated 
Presidency was therefore surprised after France changed its stance. In 
exchange for strengthening relations with the newly united German state, 
France decided to sacrifice its support for preserving Yugoslavia. 
Germany advised Croatia to be completely cooperative towards the 
international community in case the Peace Conference  collapsed because of 
internal problems, and the recognition of Croatia was soon to come.37 
Besides, Croatia was told to accept the UN Peace Corps, that is the Vance 
Plan, as a condition for international recognition, but also for possible 
membership in the UN. The Vance Plan was presented to all sides on 
December 11, while the Security Council implemented it with Resolution 
724 on December 14, 1991. The sending of peace corps was arranged, 
including the military component, but not before it was determined that all 
sides were to respect the cease-fire and the embargo on importing weapons. 
After Vanceʼs stay in Belgrade where he obtained the Serbian governmentʼs 
acceptance of the peace plan and ceasefire on December 31, 1991, on New 
Yearʼs Day 1992, he met with Tuđman who accepted the plan. The next day 
the Sarajevo Agreement was signed which stopped the war in Croatia. 
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In Croatia an idea emerged in parts of the military structure (Anton 
Tus, Petar Stipetić, Martin Špegelj, etc) that it was possible to free the entire 
territory of western Slavonia, and maybe more. Bearing in mind the 
situation at the time, such an operation was impossible. The Croatian Army 
had, with great casualties, performed operations in Bilogora and in western 
Slavonia, and a great number of soldiers were not available for further 
combat. Besides, it was revealed that the Croatian Army captured areas 
which were less defended, that is, they were defended by the local Serbs, 
while better defended lines held by the JNA were difficult to surpass.38 
According to the Vance Plan, the mission was to consist of 10 combat 
battalions, a hundred military observers and 500 civil police officers and 
assistant military and civil personnel, counting in total 10,000 people.39 It 
was then the most expensive UN project ever undertaken, and its cost was 
visible by the fact that the UN could not completely finance it , so that part 
of the expense was covered by the conflicting sides. The UNʼs policy of 
separating conflicting sides was determined primarily by the failure it 
experienced in the Congo in the 1960s, after which it stopped carrying out 
offensive operations.40 The area under the UN mandate was split into three 
UNPA zones (Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia and Krajina), or four 
sectors which were located in the zones: East (territory of Eastern Slavonia), 
West (territory of Western Slavonia), South and North (territory of Krajina). 
The International forces and observers were to be deployed in the  areas that 
were to be demilitarized, with local armed forces disbanded or required to 
withdraw. The JNA retreated, and the local Serbs reformed into a type of 
local militia. The arming of the rebels was placed under strict, ʻdoubleʼ 
surveillance, one conducted by the international representatives and the 
other by the local authorities. This ʻdoubleʼ system proved ineffective by the 
end of the war, when the Serbs managed to acquire arms. According to the 
plan, the return of  refugees was also to be enabled (which did not occur 
before the conflict ended), while the status quo was to be preserved until a 
political solution between the conflicting sides was found.41 
A part of the Croatian public was opposed to the arrival of the Peace 
Corps because it felt that military actions should be continued, while others 
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pointed to the potential ending of the war and that the UNPA zones would 
soon be returned to the legal framework of Croatia thanks to international 
forces.42 With time it was shown that the UN was not able to fulfill its task 
and that the Serbian side was not prepared to make compromises, which 
resulted in the liberation of occupied territories excluding eastern Slavonia, 
Baranja and part of Srijem (Syrmia) which were returned through peaceful 
reintegration. 
On January 14, 1992, the military mission of the UN arrived in the 
crisis areas and confirmed that conditions for a mission did exist. The next 
day Croatia received international recognition from 12 members of the 
European Community, which encouraged other countries  to recognise 
Croatia by the end of January. The president of the RSK (political entity 
formed in a meantime by Croatian Serbs) Milan Babić was opposed to the 
start of the UN mission because he considered it  a prejudical decision in 
favour of Croatia, and demanded international recognition of the RSK.43 
Babić also stressed that the Peace Corps should stand on the front-line and 
protect the Serbs. He opposed the JNAʼs retreat and wanted to personally 
negotiate with Cyrus Vance and the UNʼs General Secretary Boutros 
Boutros-Ghali.44 International factors ignored Babić, letting him know that 
they did not consider him  an international subject. To stop turning Croatia 
into Cyprus, which was desired by the Serbian rebels, Tuđman, during a 
meeting with the UNʼs Head Secretary assistant Marrack Goulding, refused 
to accept an undetermined mandate for the Peace Corps, which resulted in 
Gouldingʼs fiery departure from the meeting.45 On February 21, the Security 
Council  declared  Resolution 743 with which it confirmed that conditions 
had been created to send the Peace Corps, after the approval of the Serbian 
and Croatian authorities. UNPROFOR (United Nation Protection Forces) 
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Disagreements among  Serbian authorities over the acceptance of the 
Vance Plan 
From January 31 to February 2 a meeting of the Yugoslav Presidency was 
held with Serbian participants from Croatia and BiH. The main purpose of 
the meeting was to convince the RSK president Babić to accept the peace 
plan and the sending of the Peace Corps. Babić was the only one opposing 
the plan during the voting and soon left the meeting. According to the RSK 
Constitution, the president in absence could be replaced by the president of 
the Skupština (Assembly). As president of the Skupština, Mile Paspalj 
accepted the plan, but pointed out that it also had  to be accepted by the 
Skupština.47 In Glina, on February 9, 1992, an extraordinary meeting of the 
RSK Assembly was held under the presidency of Paspalj, inviting Branko 
Kostić, Blagoje Adžić and other members of the military and civil authorities 
from Serbia as guests, and at which the only topic was the acceptance of the 
Vance Plan. Immediately after the session, Babić notified Boutros Boutros-
Ghali that the meeting was illegal, but he was further ignored by the 
international community. The next day Babić held an extraordinary meeting 
in Knin, where it was stressed that the people had a legitimate right to decide 
for themselves, and he asked for a referendum. The Knin meeting was 
pronounced null and void on February 16 in Glina, while Babić was recalled 
from presidential duty and the referendum was revoked as well. Babićʼs 
resistance was not an important factor because Belgrade controlled the JNA 
and Martićʼs local police. Therefore, the entire leadership in Knin was forced 
to accept the plan if they wanted to continue receiving help from Belgrade.48 
 
The matter of the ʻpink zonesʼ 
 The ʻPink zonesʼ referred to areas which, according to the Vance Plan, were 
under Croatian sovereignty, but were temporarily occupied and had to be 
returned to Croatian rule. However, it was soon clear that the local Serbs 
were not prepared to hand over these areas, to which Croatia responded by 
drawing the attention of international representatives to this matter. The 
ʻpink zonesʼ represented a massive communication and economic problem 
for Croatia, and were also used to target nearby Croatian localities. After 
failed negotiations, it was decided to militarily occupy these areas. The first 
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operation of this sort happened from June 21-22 in 1992, when the 40 km² 
area of Miljevci plateau was occupied.49 In January 1993, the operation 
Gusar (Pirate) was carried out, known to the public as Operation Maslenica, 
which secured the strategically important Maslenica Bridge, the Peruča 
hydropower and the Zemunik airport. This connected the Croatian North 
with the South, also thereby solving the energetic problem. 
 
The ʻKarađorđevo agreementʼ and other political myths 
The meeting of the Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the Croatian 
President Franjo Tuđman in Karađorđevo, on March 25, 1991, is a common 
subject in daily-political discussions. For those favoring the idea that they 
planned the division of Bosnia and Herzegovina it serves as the main 
evidence for disclosing the intentions of the two presidents.50 However, it is 
important to point out that this meeting did not give rise to significant media 
attention at the time and appeared in public discussion for the first time only 
after disagreements emerged in the ruling Croatian party – HDZ, after which 
Stjepan Mesić, Josip Manolić and their supporters left the party. The first 
media launch of the ʻdivisionʼ story occurred in June 1991, when, in an 
interview for the Serbian weekly Vreme, Muhamed Filipović presented such 
a thesis with a clear aim in mind – to create suspicion amongst the Muslims 
towards the Croats, and to justify the Muslim-Serb negotiations being held 
between Filipović and Adil Zulfikarpašić and Karadžić and Milošević.51 The 
conversation between the two presidents was not heard by anybody, although 
some claim to possess audio-tapes of the talks. If the presidents did arrange 
the division of BiH, the military actions that occurred afterwards in Croatia 
and BiH clearly prove that the ʻdealʼ collapsed. In a recent book Glaurdić52 
understands the situation, but cannot cope with the fact that no division took 
place arguing that the division was arranged, but never carried out. His main 
sources of cognition are HDZ breakaways Stjepan Mesić and Dušan 
Bilandžić. However, when Mesić removes pro-Muslim moderate Stjepan 
Kljuić as head of BiH branch of HDZ, Glaurdić, out of respect, does not 
specifically name him, but mentions him in general terms as part of the more 
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radical Mate Bobanʼs faction.53 
It is also important to point out  that one third of Croatian territory was 
occupied soon after the ʻagreementʼ, as well as 70% of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. Furthermore, bearing in mind that during the aggression on 
Croatia in 1991 BiH served as a logistics base and that the JNA Banja Luka 
corps in western Slavonia was receiving money from Bosnia-Herzegovina, 
one could speak of the aggression of BiH against Croatia.54 Also, a further 
question arises – what is Bosnia-Herzegovina in this time, if it did not have 
control of its own territory and its own institutions? The meeting in 
Karađorđevo should, above all, be observed as a political myth which has a 
practical use in present times for the purpose of disqualifying political, 
ideological or academic adversaries. The Karađorđevo myth became a means 
of pacifying Croatian and Serbian nationalism and for  disabling  legitimate 
political demands and rights.55 
Political myths are also a part of the media war, the purpose of which 
is to influence the behaviour of people. Thus, the fall of Vukovar was 
presented by Serbian intelligence as a traitorous sell-out to discourage the 
Croatian population in Slavonia and force them to escape on the one hand, 
and to disqualify the political leadership on the other. The people of Vukovar  
experienced the cityʼs fall as a sell-out primarily because it was easier to deal 
with defeat as an internal betrayal, rather than admit the supremacy of the 
enemy.56 The same can be seen with the Krajina Serbs who blame Belgrade 
for the collapse of the RSK.57 
In his recently published book, retired lieutenant-general of the Army 
of RS, Novica Simić, writes openly how the ʻbetrayalʼ of Posavina was 
intentionally launched through the media to weaken Croatian forces and for 
the purpose of conquering the Posavina corridor with less effort, which was 
of vital importance for the Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The Croatian 
forces achieved initial successes mostly due to the weakness of their 
opponents, who had to transform the JNA into the Army of the RS. After the 
successful transformation, Croatian forces could not resist the enemy who 
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outnumbered them and had more military power. Besides the ʻsaleʼ of 
Posavina, Simić also notes that the First Krajina Corps leaked intentional 
misinformation on the agreement between Mate Boban and Radovan 
Karadžić in Graz:  
 
“The command of the 1st Krajina Corps, through means of 
intelligence, deliberately spread misinformation as to their 
intentions. All misunderstandings, disagreements and 
different interests between Herceg-Bosna and the Muslim 
leadership in Sarajevo were skilfully manipulated. 
Information about the agreement between Boban and 
Karadžić, which was signed in Graz, and according to 
which the Serbs were to be given a corridor through 
Posavina, was constantly repeated. Spreading the 
misinformation that the civil authorities in Osijek held a 
meeting with representatives of the Posavina and 
Semberija Serbs, with the presence of the JNA general 
Praščević, caused even more suspicion amongst Croats 
and Muslims that something was ʻgoing onʼ, and also 
confirmed doubts as to ʻfishy affairsʼ about Bosnian 
Posavina … It was a task worthy of every victim.”58 
 
The example of the Posavina ʻsaleʼ is a classic instance of an information 
war, the aim of which is to discredit the opponent. The opponents' military 
weakness was used as evidence of an intentional retreat. This type of media 
warfare was not only intended for the opponentʼs public, with the purpose of 
discrediting the other side, but also for oneʼs own public, in order to garner 
support for aims which would not be accepted by the public if the truth was 
known. The purpose of disinformation is double-natured – to justify one's 
own behaviour, intentions and goals through erroneous (untruthful) 
interpretations of someone elseʼs behaviour, intentions and goals.59 Bosnian 
Muslim leader Alija Izetbegović publicly accused Tuđman of retreating from 
Posavina, while at the same time secretly asking the international community 
to demand the retreat of Croatian forces.60 
 
 
What is Bosnia and Herzegovina and the question of its sovereignty 
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In  public and  academic discourse ʻBosniaʼ is a common subject, without a 
clear indication of what exactly contemporary, or any other, Bosnia is, while 
Herzegovina is frequently omitted from the discourse. Considering that the 
name of the country is Bosnia and Herzegovina, it should be used in its full 
form, except when it is not used exclusively for the geographical terms of 
Bosnia or Herzegovina. In such discourse, mostly in current Bosniak 
intellectual circles and/or the “socialism of semi-educated pseudo-
intellectuals”61 who comprehend the Socialist Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, established in 1943, as a natural given, Bosnia is presented as a 
millenial country, praising its statehood and multiculturalism. One 
interesting example is surely Ivan Lovrenović, who sees ʻBosniaʼ as 
something ʻmetaphysicalʼ.62 This view neglects the fact that every kind of 
medieval Bosnian uniqueness was lost in 1463 when the Bosnian kingdom 
was conquered by the Ottoman Empire. The Ottomans introduced a 
particular state system in which Bosnia did not possess any state- or legal 
uniqueness, but was merely a province that was legally no different than any 
other province in the Empire. Similarly to statehood, any kind of 
multiculturalism stopped after the Ottoman conquest. The only exception 
were the Franciscans, who represented a social institution, which sustained 
its existence through the entire period of Ottoman rule, and who also 
represented the only custodians of the memory of the medieval Bosnian state 
which grew weaker with time.63 The modern idea of multiculturalism is used, 
primarily amongst the Bosniak intellectual circles, as a type of dogma which 
one is not allowed to oppose.64 It remains unclear as to why something 
multicultural automatically means that it is something (absolutely) good, 
especially bearing in mind todayʼs situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
when a significant percentage of the population does not wish to live in the 
country. 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was united only in the 19th century, through 
the occupation by the Austro-Hungarian Empire. The purpose of its creation 
was the forming of a new and unique Bosnian nation which would prevent 
the union between Croatia and Serbia, serving as a wedge in the cleft.65 The 
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project collapsed because the central government was not able to convince 
the Catholic and the Orthodox population that they were Bosnians, and not 
Croats or Serbs. The nature of Bosnia and Herzegovina is substantially 
determined by the fact that all the way from its beginnings in the 19th century 
to this day it was created and sustained only through outside pressure. Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in todayʼs form was created at the first assembly of the 
State Anti-Fascist Council for the National Liberation of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (ZAVNOBiH) on November 25, 1943, in Mrkonjić Grad. It 
was defined as “… neither Serbian nor Croatian nor Muslim, but Serbian, 
Muslim and Croatian together.” 
Bearing in mind the conditions on the field during the international 
recognition of Bosnia and Herzegovina in April 1992, it is clear that it did 
not have sovereignty. Organized political power broke down by the end of 
1991, through the separation of parts of the territory by the Serbs, and the 
founding of the HZ HB. It is important to point out that the HZ HB did not 
separate, but rather it acknowledged the stateʼs authority as long as there was 
national independence in relation to any kind of Yugoslavia.66 It did, 
however, set up a different social structure to protect itself from Serbian 
conquests due to the inability and the lack of will of the central government 
in Sarajevo to protect the population. Glaurdić recently shows a lack of 
understanding of the problem, equalising the separation of Serbian territories 
from Bosnia and Herzegovina with the founding of Croatian administrative 
areas within BiH. He also claims that: “… in the Yugoslav Constitution 
Bosnia and Herzegovina was defined as a state, like the other republics”,67 
which is doubtful, because the particularity of SR BiH was the fact that 
sovereignity was not conferred to a single nation, but rather was shared by 
three equal nations. 
Apart from all of the above, the central authorities were not capable of 
controlling the repressive organs of the state (police and  army) on at least 
half of the territory they laid claim to in 1992.68 Furthermore, it is important 
to add that at least one third of the population clearly demonstrated that they 
did not acknowledge the authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina with its own 
central institutions and refused to participate in the referendum on 
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independence conducted on February 29 and March 1, 1992. An important 
determinant of behaviour of all three sides was the attitude toward the 
Constitution. The Croatian side, as the smallest, accepted most of the 
solutions, and stressed as the only condition, separation from Yugoslavia. 
The Muslim side used institutions according to need, most often 
unconstitutionally because of the lack of consent from all three nations. The 
Serb side was least concerned about the Constitution, considering that they 
possessed a force able to control  conditions on the field. 
The central authorities themselves had, as a repressive organ, 
according to all definitions, a paramilitary Muslim formation called The 
Patriotic League (Patriotska liga) which will later evolve into the official 
army of the central Muslim government in Sarajevo – the ABiH. In early 
1992, the Patriotic League stressed as its main task, even though no larger 
conflicts between Croats and Muslims had yet emerged, the ʻprotection of 
the Muslim peopleʼ, and also counted amongst their enemies  the ʻextreme 
forces of the HDZ (strength ranging from one to two brigades)ʼ.69 
 
The main political parties and their goals 
In the summer of 1990, three national parties were founded, gaining 
significant support at the first free elections, and which were to play crucial 
roles during the war, and still do to this day. Alija Izetbegović became the 
president of the SDA, which defined itself as the party for Yugoslav citizens 
who belong to the Muslim historical and cultural circle. Radovan Karadžić 
was chosen to lead the SDS, and this party was declared as an ʻall-Serbian 
national movementʼ. Davor Perinović was elected to be the president of the 
BiH branch of the HDZ, but was removed in September and his place was 
taken, as the officer in charge, by a sports journalist, Stjepan Kljuić. The 
HDZ declared itself as ʻpolitical movement of all Croatians in the worldʼ.70 
Therefore, none of these parties were based exclusively on Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. It is important to point out that, out of these three national 
parties, HDZ had the least educated members, which led to incompetence in 
strategic thinking, both medium and long term.71 Unlike the other two sides, 
the Croatian Communist leadership, during the Communist government, had 
no legitimacy amongst the people, which caused it to be frequently 
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condemned by the Central Committee.72 Thus it was only after the first 
democratic elections that most of the Croatian politicians started to 
participate in political life, without the previous knowledge possessed by the 
Muslim and the Serbian side. 
The first democratic elections were held on November 18, 1990, and 
won by a coalition of national parties which secured 84% of the mandates in 
the Parliament of the SR BiH. The elections reflected the national structure 
which has remained the practice until the present day. It is important to note 
that many Western social scientists dispute the free choice and  democratic 
right of the citizens in 1990, considering them to be too immature to make 
their own political decisions. Using the ʻsubsequent clevernessʼ syndrome, 
they have concluded that it would have been better if the citizens had voted 
for the reformed Communists of Ante Marković, which would have allowed 
the country to prosper, unlike with the ʻnationalistsʼ who brought it war.73 
It was clear from the start that this type of coalition would have 
difficulties in reaching a common platform. The key question was that of 
BiH remaining in or leaving Yugoslavia, which happened after the 
acceptance of the Declaration of Sovereignty. It is important to point out that 
the feeling of fellowship in BiH was related to Yugoslavism, and not 
republican ʻBosnianʼ identity. Accordingly, the relationship with Yugoslavia 
determined mutual relations between the three nations.74 All three sides had a 
different vision of the internal arrangement of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
which would remain visible during the entire war, and also later on. 
 
The referendum on independence and international recognition 
The decision on holding the referendum to confirm status of BiH was 
brought on January 24 and 25 in 1992 in the Skupština in the absence of 
Serbian representatives. In October they founded the Skupština of the 
Serbian people in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For this period it is important to 
point to the excellent detail noticed by Pehar.75 It concerns the 50th meeting 
of the Presidency of SR BiH held on January 10 under the presidentship of 
Alija Izetbegović with only one item on the agenda – the Decision of the 
Serbian Skupština on the proclamation of the Republic of the Serbian nation 
                                                          
72 Lučić (2013): 22. 
73 E.g. Chandler (2000): 7-33. 
74 Lučić (2013): 179. 
75 Pehar (2011). 
Croatian Studies Review 9 (2013) 
41 
 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The meeting was attended by the representatives of 
SR BiH from Serbian ranks, Biljana Plavšić and Nikola Koljević. 
The session was a potential arena at which  negotiations could have 
taken place, but the result was the opposite. Izetbegović addressed  the 
Serbian representatives with a preponderant tone, stating that they would be 
arrested in any normal country, which automatically implied that the Serbs 
were impossible to negotiate with and that he saw them as criminals and 
persons against whom state force should be used. Although he had been a 
political prisoner, Izetbegović clearly showed by his stand that he viewed the 
state from an exclusively Marxist point of view, that is, as an instrument of 
power by which one group ruled over another. Besides, Izetbegović 
considered that he himself knew what was best for the Serbs in BiH and that 
they had enough rights. Instead of attempting to negotiate, Izetbegović 
threatened war and compared the Serbs with the Nazis. Summarising this 
speech, one can clearly conlude that Izetbegović felt that only an integral 
BiH could be the ʻorder-issuing authorityʼ, a state in which the internal 
organisation had to be arranged exclusively according to his ideas, while 
everything else was considered  Nazi expansionism. He had shown clearly 
that he was ready to start a war over this question. 
The Serbian representatives tried to polemicise with Izetbegović, 
seeking a compromise solution, which was utterly ignored by Izetbegović. 
Nikola Koljević admitted that the ʻDecisionʼ was anti-constitutional and 
should be discussed because it represented the reality on the field. To all this 
Izetbegović reacted by negating the legitimacy of the Serbian 
representatives, requesting that the people manifest their wishes through a 
referendum on independence.76 It is not hard to conclude that such a ʻone 
man – one voteʼ principle led to the overruling of minorities. By the publicly 
uttered principle of a ʻcivil republic or civil warʼ,77 it was clear that the denial 
of the Muslim privilege to represent all citizens inevitably meant war. A part 
of the mentality of the Muslim political elite is reflected in the statement by 
Hadžo Efendić, who claimed that they (Muslims) ʻdo not have another 
homelandʼ,78 which had a clear meaning – Serbs and Croats, go to your home 
countries and achieve your goals there. As an argument against negotiations, 
Izetbegović pointed to the diversity of the negotiating sides and saw a 
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referendum as the only possible solution. By refusing to negotiate with the 
Serbs, he was left with the Croats as the only partners for a referendum. 
On the Croatian side, Stjepan Kljuić was losing more and more 
credibility due to the lack of public reaction to the Serbian aggression on 
Croatian areas, and at the beginning of February resigned at the meeting of 
HDZ in Široki Brijeg under the presidency of Stjepan Mesić. The central 
committee of the HDZ was not satisfied with the formulation of the 
referendum and wanted to put forward a demand for ʻnational cantonsʼ. As 
the meeting was held in Livno, the matter of national cantons is now known 
as the Livanjsko pitanje (The Livno Question). The Parliament of SR BiH 
rejected the Livanjsko pitanje, but invited Croats to vote for independence. 
The international community accepted the Croatian demands, which were 
included in the Cutileiro Plan79, according to which Bosnia and Herzegovina 
was to be a state composed of three units based on national, geographic, 
economic and other criteria. The first round of talks was held on February 13 
and 14, on the first day with the three leading parties, and including the 
opposition on the second day. An agreement was not reached, while an 
extention for talks was announced for February 21 and 22 in Lisbon.80 After 
returning from the negotiations in Lisbon, Alija Izetbegović stated, at an 
expanded meeting of the SDA, that the referendum depended on Croatian 
votes and that he therefore promised them “… some sort of sovereignty, 
some kind of national recognition, some regions.”81 It is important to point 
out that immediately after arriving back from Lisbon, Karadžić replied that 
an agreement on the new referendum formulation should be reached if there 
was time.82 
The referendum was held on February 29 and March 1, resulting in 
62.68% of the population voting for independence, primarily Muslims and 
Croats. Simultaneously, the situation became worse when two Serbs near 
Travnik were killed while trying to break through Serbian road barricades. In 
Sarajevo, Serbian nuptials were attacked by a number of Muslims, resulting 
in one death, and one injured. The SDS blocked on March 2 all important 
crossroads in Sarajevo and stressed that this was an assault on the entire 
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Serbian nation.83 The negotiations continued and on March 9 in Bruxelles the 
ʻStatement on the principles for a new constitutional arrangement in Bosnia 
and Herzegovinaʼ84 was proclaimed,  reflecting the negotiations held hitherto 
on the arrangement of BiH as a state divided into three units with a national 
appellation. Local governments would have broad authority, while the state 
would be decentralized with the central government being a guardian of 
sustainability and key strategic interests. After the negotiations were nearly 
finished, Izetbegović stated that he did not want national regions which were 
the basis of the new constitutional proposal. On March 11 the Serbian 
Skupština rejected the Bruxelles constitutional arrangement emphasising that 
the minimum that the Serbs could accept was to either remain in Yugoslavia 
or a confederal state consisting  of three national states.85  
On April 6, a group of citizens from a large anti-war rally held outside 
crashed into the building of the BiH Skupština in Sarajevo and proclaimed 
the ʻAll-National Parliament of the Citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼ. 
The Council of Ministers of the European Community recognised it on the 
same day, while the United States, Austria and Croatia followed suit on April 
7.86 The Muslim rejection of the very basis of the new constitutional 
arrangement was probably suggested by American diplomacy. The Serbs, 
regardless of their rejection of the plan, were prepared for further 
negotiations. The question remains as to whether  they were just trying to 
ʻbuy some timeʼ for further conquests or were they prepared, as they 
themselves stressed, to accept a federal BiH inside Yugoslavia or a 
confederal state consisting of three national units. After Izetbegović 
retreated, there was a lack of international pressure on the sides to accept the 
plan, which resulted in further negotiations throughout April and May in 
Sarajevo and Lisbon with poor chances of being accepted. The impossibility 
of a real threat from the international community in case of non-acceptance 
of the plan highlighted its weakness i.e. its inability to force an 
implementation through the deployment of land troops, which is one of the 
main tasks in international mediation. One of the causes of the reluctance of 
the international community to send combat forces was, as Boutros Boutros-
Ghali pointed out, the unfavourable natural geographic conditions, which 
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caused dread considering the American experience in Vietnam.87 
International weakness became, above all, an impetus for the Serbian and 
Muslim side to stall and to put off the negotiations. This type of ʻfingers 
crossedʼ negotiation tactic consisted of consent in principle and of  sudden 
withdrawal if the others accepted it and would remain a characteristic of 
Muslim diplomacy throughout the war. The Muslim goal was an integral 
state exclusively under their rule, and then, if that was not possible, to 
acquire a larger part of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Cutileiroʼs Plan  offered the 
Muslims 44% of the territory, which matched their representation in the 
country, and included urban areas with numerous mineral, industrial and 
infrastructural resources. This meant that the Muslim side was offered the 
most out of all three nations. The Serbs were also offered 44% of the 
territory which was more than their share of the population. However, the 
given areas were not as developed and did not enable a complete link to be 
made with the occupied areas in Croatia. The Croats were to be given less 
territory considering their share of the population, but they accepted the plan 
in principle.88 
According to the Cutileiro Plan, the Parliament was to be bicameral. 
One House would be directly elected, while the other would have an even 
number of representatives from all three communities to prevent over-voting. 
The central government would be in charge of defence and foreign affairs, 
the economy and finances, infrastructure and the basic needs of the 
population. Every community would have broad regional authority and the 
possibility of veto in the Parliament on everything that could damage their 
interests. Besides, all communities were allowed to decide for themselves as 
long as this did not endanger the independence and territorial integrity of the 
whole of the country.89 
The rejection of the Cutileiro Plan by the Muslim side was 
accompanied by three documents published by the Presidency and the 
Government – ʻThe Platform for Actions of the BiH Presidency in Warfareʼ, 
ʻStandpoints on the Administrative and Territorial Arrangement of BiHʼ and 
ʻConstitutional Principles for the Internal Arrangement of the Republic of 
BiHʼ. The documents shared a negative attitude towards cantonization, i.e. 
the organisation of the state upon (albeit not solely) the ethnic principle. 
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Therefore, the Muslims, who controlled 21% of the territory, would decide 
for all citizens, regardless of the fact that the Cutileiro Plan was a 
precondition for international recognition. According to these documents, an 
arrangement similar to the plan was proposed, but differed from it by 
renouncing  sovereignty for the regions. The Cutileiro Plan saw the regions 
as the source of sovereignty i.e. as units with constitutionality, in which 
national majorities could form their own administration. This is why the 
Muslims resisted the ʻethnic criteriaʼ so strongly. According to Muslim 
plans, the regions were to be established by the Republic of Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, and most of them would not have been able to make 
independent political decisions, but only economic and cultural decisions. 
The central government was to be constructed so as  to ensure the dominance 
of the majority without the possibility of being endangered, that is, through a 
control mechanism.90 This was the Muslim idea shown in Izetbegovićʼs 
statement talking about “… some kind of sovereignty, some national rights 
and some regions.” 
On July 21, Tuđman and Izetbegović signed the ʻAgreement of 
Friendship and Cooperationʼ, but Izetbegović refused to sign a military 
agreement, stating that the Serbian people would “… surely see it as a 
threat” and that “… it would be better to leave more room for the operations 
of international factors.”91 The Cutileiro mission officially failed on August 
26, 1992 at the London conference when Cutileiro and Lord Carrington 
resigned, and were replaced by Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen.92 It is 
interesting to note, though one should conduct further research into the 
matter,  that during the first 6 months of the conflict, the number of killed 
counted for four fifths of the total number of killed in the entire war in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, and that the most of the war crimes were 
committed by the JNA and Serbian paramilitary troops.93 
 
The Vance-Owen plan as the first attempt to establish a unitary BiH 
As regards the aforementioned Muslim objections, the newly elected Vance 
and Owen started working on a new plan which would partly satisfy the 
demands of all sides. According to this new plan BiH would be organized 
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into ten regions (provinces) – three for every nation and a neutral Sarajevo 
district. It would be a unitary decentralised state which would mean a loss of 
sovereignty for Croats and Serbs under the disguise of multi-ethnicity, 
whereas Muslims would only be fully sovereign as the most numerous 
people. Croats and Serbs would have only national-cultural identities without 
special local and state political rights. The Muslim strategy was to provoke 
military interventions against the Serbs or to diplomatically force the 
international community to coerce the other two sides to accept their 
conditions.94 
The Vance-Owen Plan was supported by the European Community and 
Russia, but the main role in its rejection was played by the United States. 
The Bush administration had kept away from Bosnia and Herzegovina since 
the beginning of the crisis, possibly because of the economic relationships 
established with Serbia by some high officials such as Brent Scowcroft and 
Lawrence Eagleburger. Also, the territory of Yugoslavia lost its geostrategic 
importance so that the United States left the resolution of the crisis to the 
European Community.95 After the Vance-Owen plan was presented, the 
Muslims seemed clearly satisfied with its propositions. The plan consisted of 
three parts: military, political and a map of delineation. The military part 
included the separation of the warring sides, demilitarization of Sarajevo and 
placing heavy armament under control. According to the political part, every 
unit had to have an administrative and economic centre, but without political 
autonomy. A bicameral parliament was to be organized with a directly 
elected House of Representatives and House of Peoples which would consist 
of members of the regional governments. The House of Representatives 
would be elected by the principle of proportional representation which would 
have led to the domination of the most numerous peoples according to the 
principle of ʻone man – one voteʼ. This was clearly the result of a 
compromise according to the idea of either a ʻcivil state or civil warʼ. To 
ensure majority domination completely, it was proposed that in the case of 
disagreement between the Houses, the last word would be the one of the 
House of Representatives.96 
The situation changed drastically when presidental candidate Bill 
Clinton started to mention possible military intervention against the Serbs in 
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Bosnia and Herzegovina in his campaign. Since then the Muslim side started 
to linger in negotiations. In the case of military intervention against the 
Serbs, they could establish control over most parts of BiH. The Serbs 
rejected the unitary plan and seized mostly Muslim territories in eastern 
Bosnia, except the enclaves of Srebrenica, Goražde and Žepa.97 A potential 
reason for the Serbian rejection may be linked to the third unit in the Vance-
Owen plan, which would have split the unification of all territories under 
Serbian control, causing problems of supply in western Bosnia and the Serb-
held parts in the Republic of Croatia.98 
The Vance-Owen plan led to an open Muslim-Croat war in territories 
under joint control. Bearing in mind that the Croatian side was interested in 
accepting the plan, while the Serbian side even proclaimed a ʻDeclaration of 
the conclusion of warʼ on December 17, it is obvious that the Muslim side 
was dissatisfied with the plan, although they publicly proclaimed their 
acceptance of it. Muslim attacks on Croats followed in central Bosnia, where 
the Muslims were numerically able to overpower the Croats.99 One of the 
strongest pieces of evidence for this can be found in the statement of Rasim 
Delić, Commander-in-Chief of ABiH in February 1994 on how: 
 
“ … the HVO was eliminated from the territories of 
Jablanica, Konjic, Fojnica, Kakanj, Zenica, Travnik and 
Bugojno. Therefore, one complete province according to 
the Vance-Owen plan with its centre in Travnik.”100 
 
After the Serbian rejection of the Vance-Owen plan, the International 
Conference on the former Yugoslavia decided to move from Geneva to New 
York so that the Security Council could adopt the resolution on its 
implementation. Its implementation was overruled by the votes of the five 
permanent members after the objection of the United States. After 
unsuccessful negotiations with his former deputy from the State Department, 
Warren Christopher, Cyrus Vance resigned from duty. He was replaced by 
the former Norwegian minister of defence and actual minister of 
international affairs Thorvald Stoltenberg on May 1. In order to retain  good 
relations with their European allies, on Ferbruary 10, 1993, the United States 
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announced its six statements on American policy towards Bosnia and 
Herzegovina: all agreements must be the result of negotiations, not imposed, 
sanctions against Serbia should be  stricter; the use of military force in the 
case of Serbian involvement in Kosovo; the cessation of murders and 
destruction; and all agreements needed to be conducted on the field after 
consultation with the allies of the US.101 The United States rejected the 
Vance-Owen plan beacuse of its unreadiness to send combat troops and in 
order to establish closer connections with the Islamic world and the Muslim 
lobby in the United States, which surely made a big impression on politicians 
who lived in the United States such as Ejup Ganić and Muhamed Šaćirbey. 
The Security Council adopted Resolution 820 on April 17 1993 in 
order to force the Serbian side to sign the Vance-Owen plan within a period 
of 9 days under the threat of the enlargement of sanctions. Lord Owen was in 
Belgrade from April 21 to 26 trying to convince Milošević and Dobrica 
Ćosić to force the Serbs from BiH to sign the plan. On April 25 and 26, the 
Serbs from BiH decided to conduct a referendum on whether to accept the 
plan. The purpose of conducting the referendum was probably to buy more 
time and not to suffer more sanctions. Such a plan proved to be wrong 
because of the Security Councilʼs Resolution 821, which expelled 
Yugoslavia from ECOSOC (UN economic and social committee). The last 
attempt to save the Vance-Owen Plan occurred at the beginning of May in 
Athens when Milošević, Ćosić and Greek Prime Minister Konstantinos 
Mitsotakis tried to convince Karadžić to sign the plan. Karadžić signed the 
plan, but stated that his signature had to be ratified by the Parliament. 
Milošević, Ćosić, Mitsotakis and the Montenegrin president Momir 
Bulatović were present during the assembly in order to force a positive 
outcome. A great majority of Parliament members (96%) supported the  
referendum.102 Although Milošević was disappointed, it was only due to the 
sanctions against Yugoslavia. That moment was a turning point because 
local Serbian leaders were not ready for a compromise and wanted the 
promised unification with, or federal status within, Yugoslavia. In 1994, 
Milošević tried to get better cooperation by appointing Borislav Mikelić as 
Prime Minister of the RSK. That action proved to be unsuccessful due to the 
rejection  of cooperation with Croatian authorities by RSK politicians. Serbs 
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in BiH had a ʻplan Bʼ which was stated in the ʻDeclaration of the 
continuation of the peace processʼ103 on  May 19. After rejection of the 
Vance-Owen plan, the main idea of this new plan was a Serbian republic in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
 
Progressive implementation and the Joint action plan  
The international community and Russia held a meeting on May 16 in 
Moscow on a Russian initiative. The main topic was the progressive 
implementation of the Vance-Owen plan. An agreement was generally 
accepted, but the biggest problem was the sending of military troops and 
observers. The United States promised to send air forces without ground 
troops. Lord Owen held a meeting with the Croatian and Bosniak side on  
May 18 in Međugorje at which a progressive implementation of the plan was 
accepted. The Vance-Owen Plan was to be put into action in territories under 
Croatian and Bosniak control. During the next two days, Lord Owen 
travelled to NATO headquarters in Naples, as well as to Minsk and Kiev to 
find military troops and observers for the mission. Although Belarus and 
Ukraine accepted the deployment of troops, the plan of progressive 
implementation was not carried out because the strongest forces rejected 
sending ground troops, probably because a potential failure would be hard to 
explain to their domestic public.104 
The major forces published the ʻJoint statement of Bosnia and 
Herzegovinaʼ105 on  May 22, also known as the ʻJoint Action Planʼ. The plan 
was adopted by states which were to provide the majority of troops: United 
States, Russia, Spain, France and United Kingdom. This plan meant the final 
ending of the Vance-Owen plan. The main points of the new plan were: 
sending humanitarian help, enlargement of sanctions against Serbia and 
Montenegro until their withdrawal from the occupied territories, closure of 
the borders of Bosnia and Herzegovina (especially with Serbia), founding of 
protected areas, continuing the prohibition of flights over Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, founding of a court for war crimes, establishing permanent 
peace in order to prevent the conflict from spilling over into neighbouring 
countries. Point 8 is worthy of note because it was probably inserted by the 
American side on the insistence of the Bosniaks: 
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“Central Bosnia and Herzegovina. We are deeply worried 
because of conflict between Bosnian Croats and forces of 
the Bosnian government and the ʻethnic cleansingʼ that 
follows; therefore we are willing to send Croatia a 
warning if they continue to send help to the Bosnian 
Croats in combat, in which case they could be punished by 
sanctions of the international community.”106 
 
This type of formulation was only possible amongst pro-Bosniac circles, 
which was primarily reflected in the meaningless phrase ʻCentral Bosnia and 
Herzegovinaʼ. There is the geographic term of central Bosnia, but it remains 
unclear how this is connected with Herzegovina and which area precisely 
comprises ʻCentral Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼ. Secondly, the formulation 
ʻforces of the Bosnian governmentʼ had the aim of covering up the fact that 
these were actually Bosniak forces, thereby attempting to provide them with 
state legitimacy. It is interesting to note that in the statement “… the conflict 
between Bosnian Croats and the forces of the Bosnian government” there is 
no mention of Herzegovina which was mentioned in the previous sentence. 
The tragicomic situation concerning the introduction of international 
sanctions against Croatia because of its assistance to the ʻBosnian Croatsʼ is 
primarily reflected in the documents of the time from which it is visible that 
the Bosniak side demanded (and received) arms and military equipment from 
Croatia throughout the entire period.107 Croatia risked international sanctions 
by sending weapons packed in food through humanitarian convoys.108 It is 
also interesting to note  the order from the Third Zenica Corps of ABiH 
relating to the shooting down of a Croatian helicopter even though the flight 
was previously announced.109 This led to the somewhat paradoxal situation in 
which the Bosniak side demanded that Croatia cease sending help to its own 
people while requesting the same help for itself, regardless of the fact that 
they were launching offensive operations precisely against those Croats. 
The shortcoming of the Joint Action Plan was that there was no 
specific mention as to  what would happen, apart from sanctions, if the Serbs 
continued their offensive or how much time was anticipated for a Serbian 
                                                          
106 M. Tuđman (2005): 389. 
107 Praljak (2007): 41, 52, 68, 69 (Only the first four pages of the publication are numerated, and 
the page number of documents is an extension of the same numeration). 
108 Praljak (2007): 70-73. 
109 Praljak (2007): 63. 
Croatian Studies Review 9 (2013) 
51 
 
retreat from the occupied territories. 
A meeting was supposed to be held on June 3 and 4, but did not take 
place because Mate Bobanʼs helicopter was fired upon. In the agreement 
with  representatives of the international community concerning the meeting, 
Izetbegović requested that Serbian positions in the presidency belonging to  
the legitimately elected SDS should be replaced with Serbs from other 
parties, granting himself the right to choose people who should represent the 
Serbs. As the meeting failed to take place, negotiations were led with each 
side individually. Karadžić wanted observers to be sent and emphasised the 
Bosniak attacks on all fronts.110 A problem occured relating to the attack on 
Goražde which was skilfully used by the Bosniak side to pressure the 
international public which was consistent with their ʻstrategy of the weakʼ, 
even though Goražde was a legitimate military goal as it had ammunitions 
factory ʻPobjedaʼ, which had an underground section for wartime 
operations.111 
After the attacks on buses in Novi Travnik, it was decided that  
negotiations would be continued in Geneva on June 13 and 14.112 Even 
though the Bosniak side publicly stressed its desire for an end to the  war, 
but, due to the unaccomplished war aim of establishing a unitary Bosnia and 
Herzegovina (preferably including the entire country) and American support,  
in finding themselves in the likely situation of a cessation of military 
operations Alija Izetbegović and Ejup Ganić refused to sit at the same table 
with Karadžić in Geneva, clearly showing that they had no intention to join 
any negotiations. This type of mentality inherited from the Communist 
system was visible not only on the Bosniak side, but also during the 
negotiations on the Z-4 Plan when Milan Babić refused to touch the paper on 
which the agreement was written. It was also seen during the negotiations in 
Rambouillet when Slobodan Milošević sat with his arms crossed, refusing to 
take a pen to correct what he considered wrong. According to the agreement, 
the establishment of provinces and local jurisdictions was to be enabled, as 
well as the creation of a court for human rights which would support 
international humanitarian law, and cooperation with the international 
humanitarian mission. The result of the voting was three in favour, three 
opposing and three sustained, after which the agreement was then forwarded 
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to the Presidency for voting.113 Izetbegović categorically rejected the 
agreement primarily because it was not of a unitary character, and enabled 
the national communities to create provinces and local jurisdictions. 
 
The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan 
After the Serbian rejection of the Vance-Owen Plan, and the short failed 
episode with progressive implementation and the Joint Action Plan, which 
collapsed because of the Bosniak rejection, the international community 
attempted to find a solution with the new Owen-Stoltenberg peace plan 
which was very much like the Cutillero plan, a plan generally accepted by 
the Serbs. Owen and Stoltenberg organized negotiations on June 15 and 16 
in Genthod, Switzerland, which was attended by presidents Milošević, 
Bulatović, Tuđman and Izetbegović, as well as  Radovan Karadžić and Mate 
Boban. Presidents Tuđman and Milošević suggested the idea of a Federative 
Republic of BiH, consisting of three constitutive republics without 
international subjectivity, the securing of Bosniak territory with a gateway to 
the sea, the right of return for refugees  and  respect for human rights. After it 
seemed that all was arranged, on June 23 Izetbegović promised to discuss the 
model with the Presidency, but immediately after leaving the meeting told 
the journalists outside that he had given up on that plan.114 In a statement for 
the BiH radio-television on July 8, Izetbegović claimed the following with 
regard to the peace initiative: “It is a very ugly option, that is all I can say to 
you at the moment.”115 The following day, the Office of the BiH Presidency 
issued a denial on agreeing to confederalize BiH, in which it was stated that 
confederalization, that is, ethnic division can: 
 
“ (…) be imposed as a solution only under the condition 
that there is no other choice, in other words, if the the 
following choice is presented – either that [ethnic 
division] or starting a neverending war, which would lead 
us back to  living in caves.”116 
 
The risk of living in caves was obviously not a great problem for the 
Muslims, since they continued to reject the agreement even though they were 
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not able to occupy and secure any larger city. The only offensive success of 
the ABiH was noted against the drastically outnumbered Croats in central 
Bosnia. 
On July 17, 1993, the Presidency of BiH issued a ʻStarting Point of the 
BiH Presidency for Negotiations in Genevaʼ.117 The ʻStarting Pointʼ again 
stressed that the Parliament should be bicameral, with the Lower House 
being represented proportionally to the population, which would give the 
starting advantage to the most numerous nation – the Bosniaks, and also 
enable the unitarization of BiH. At the end of the document, it was noted 
that, in the case of the rejection of the proposal, the Presidency was prepared 
to propose to the Security Council the establishment of an international 
protectorate over BiH. 
In Geneva, on July 30, the ʻConstitutional agreement on the Union of 
the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovinaʼ was concluded and was supposed 
to be implemented once agreement over maps and humanitarian rights was 
reached. Each republic would have a right to veto, while the Parliament 
would consist of 120 positions according to the principle of  parity  – equal 
representation from each member of the Union. The Presidency was to 
consist of presidents of the three republics who would change every four 
months, and would decide by consensus. The competencies of the Union 
were to be foreign affairs, foreign trade and the functioning of common 
institutions, while all other power would be handed to the republics. None of 
the constitutive republics would be allowed to leave the Union without the 
consent of all republics.118 
The next day Alija Izetbegović withdrew his signature on the advice of 
his legal advisor, Francis Boyle, because the membership of BiH in the UN 
seemed to be in question. Even though Izetbegović was promised that the 
status of the Union in the UN would not be changed, the Bosniak side sought 
an immediate guarantee from the Security Council and the General 
Assembly.119 On August 4, Alija Izetbegović sent a letter to Tuđman in 
which he suggested a union between the territories of the Bosniak and  
Croatian Republics and the continuation of the fighting against the Serbs. 
Also, the resignation of people who had brought about the current state of 
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affairs was sought and offered by Izetbegović.120 This move once again 
shows the unwillingness to stop the conflict and a willingness to continue the 
war against the Serbs, i.e. a desire for acquiring even more territory whilst 
trying to lure the Croats to the Bosniak side by offering them part of 
government power which would, in practice, mean majority rule over the 
Serbs. The maximum that the Bosniaks were willing to offer was cultural 
autonomy, while political autonomy was not mentioned at all. It is 
interesting to note that, by directly sending the letter to the Croatian 
president, Izetbegović ignored the legitimate Croatian representatives in BiH. 
The answer from Tuđman arrived on August 10, in which it was stressed that 
Croatia was ready for cooperation between the two constitutive units, but  
that this agreement had to be reached by the legitimate representatives of 
those republics and that Bosniak offensive operations against Croatian areas 
had to be stopped.121 The military chiefs of all three sides signed a truce on 
August 11 at  Sarajevo Airport. It was agreed upon to postpone discussion on 
the disputed areas of Brčko, Posavina, eastern Bosnia, Bihać pocket, eastern 
Herzegovina, central Bosnia and Sarajevo for a later date. 
In line with the idea of a union between the three republics, on August 
28, 1993 the Croatian side proclaimed the HR HB in Grude. Even though 
HR HB is commonly regarded as a creation of a Greater Croatia and a 
unilateral act, the fact is that the stimulus for this idea originated from  
circles of the international community. Besides, in the resolution of its 
establishment it was stressed that the Croats, as a constitutive nation, were 
establishing a state community with other nations as the bearers of 
sovereignty. However, there was no mention of the right to secession or the 
desire for  annexation to Croatia.122 On the contrary, the HR HB House of 
Representatives issued the ʻDeclaration for an independent BIH as a union of 
equal republicsʼ in which it was stressed that: “ … we are in favour of Bosnia 
and Herzegovinaʼs independence in internationally recognised borders, as a 
state of three equal constitutional nations” and: 
 
 “ … the founding of the state of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 
as an independent and internationally recognised state, is 
only possible with the consent of all three equal and 
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constitutional nations and all together, through the Union 
of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.”123 
 
On September 20, negotiations were held on the British HMS Invincible war 
ship between the representatives of the international community and 
Tuđman, Izetbegović, Milošević, Bulatović and Radovan Karadžić and Mate 
Boban. It seemed that all parties agreed to the proposed arrangements and 
territorial solutions, but the Bosniak side rejected the agreement. The treaty 
offered 30% of the territory to the Bosniak Republic with  access to the 
Brčko and  Neretva ports, which would be connected with the Adriatic at the 
Port of Ploče, through a concession of 99 years provided by Croatia. 
Sarajevo would be under UN administration, and Mostar under EU 
administration.124 
After yet another rejection of the amended version of the Owen-
Stoltenberg Plan known as the ʻThe Peace Packet on Bosnia and 
Herzegovinaʼ from late September 1993, on October 20 Alija Izetbegović 
issued a resolution on the recall of the Croatian members of the Presidency, 
Franjo Boras and Vitomir Miro Lasić, and replaced them with Ivo Komšić 
and Stjepan Kljuić, who both enjoyed Izetbegovićʼs favour.125 
 
The Action Plan of the European Union 
After the Bosniaks refused the plan from HMS Invincible, Lord Owen 
started the initiative for the wider pacification of the region, including 
Kosovo, RSK and BiH. If a solution could be found for RSK, then sanctions 
against Yugoslavia would be removed. This plan failed when Tuđman 
announced after talks in Norway in early November that he was prepared, at 
most, to acknowledge the local and cultural autonomy of the Serbs in 
Croatia.126 
In his peace initiative from Novemeber 2, President Tuđman requested 
that the international community  impel all conflicting sides to sign in favour 
of the Union within 14 days, under the threat of sanctions.127 Following this, 
the international community started a peace initiative known as the Action 
Plan of the EU, the primary goal of which was to convince the Bosniak side 
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to accept the Union, and was set in motion by Germany and France. The 
Bosniak side was offered a small expansion of its territory, according to 
which they would be given 33.56%, and the Croats 17.5%. The starting point 
for the negotiations was the packet from the HMS Invincible, while the 
Bosniak side was advised to agree with the other sides under the threat of 
reducing international support. Izetbegović demanded the opening of the 
airport in Tuzla, which was not agreeable to the Serbs because they were 
(justly) afraid that it would be used for military purposes, and he also 
requested, somewhat nebulously, the sending of peace troops to only the 
Bosniak parts of the territory for a period of 5 years, in order to protect the 
Bosniak side until it developed an armed capacity for self-defence. Milošević 
requested the removal of sanctions because he had fulfilled all conditions, 
while the acceptance of the plan depended on the Bosniaks. In the meantime, 
during November the ABiH expelled Croats from Vareš, and in December 
laid siege to Vitez.128 
At the meeting in Bruxelles between the three BiH sides and the 
ministers of foreign affairs of the European Twelve, on December 22 and 23, 
Izetbegović rejected the solution offered, and after that Karadžić no longer 
agreed to the UN administration in Sarajevo.129 As a response, the Bosniak 
side attacked the Serb-held suburb of Grbavica in Sarajevo in the first weeks 
of January. On the initiative of Tuđman, Milošević and Bulatović, a meeting 
was held on January 18 and 19 in Geneva with Izetbegović, Karadžić and 
Mile Akmadžić (Prime-minister of HR HB). The Bosniak side remained 
inflexible and demanded 40% of the territory, access to Neum, the merging 
of the eastern enclaves and  access to the Sava River.130 
The Owen-Stoltenberg Plan and the Action Plan of the EU collapsed 
due exclusively to the disagreement of the Bosniak side with American 
support. These plans did not satisfy Bosniak appetites for as much territory 
as possible, if not the entire territory, while the American rejection was 
primarily due to the unwillingness to send a large number of combat troops. 
According to the budget, the peace mission would have totalled 
approximately 60,000 men, and one third of this was to be secured by the 
USA. 
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The Washington Agreement 
At a meeting on January 18, 1994, Presidents Tuđman and Izetbegović, 
together with Haris Silajdžić (Bosniak minister of Foreign Affairs) and 
Krešimir Zubak (the President of HR HB), signed a proposal drafted by the 
BiH Federation Constitution and a preliminary agreement on the future 
economic and military cooperation between the Federation of BiH and 
Croatia. According to the treaty, there had to be ethnic parity in 
parliamentary representation, while cantonization was a subject for future 
discussion. Silajdžić was in favor of the deal, but Izetbegović was against it. 
The new initiative brought the active involvement of the USA toward 
solving the crisis in which it had previously stood to the side and was the one 
to blame for the failure of all previous peace plans. Meanwhile, Mate Boban 
was removed from office, and replaced by Krešimir Zubak. Prime ministers 
Silajdžić and Granić were invited to a new round of negotiations in the State 
Department from February 27 to March 2. Both prime ministers were left 
surprised by the radical turn in the negotiations.131 
Specifically, it was no longer possible to hold long negotiations, as  
was the practice before, or to change key points of the agreement. All that 
was left to them was to agree over trifles. It was the principle of  take it or 
leave it, which would now be promoted by the USA, and the ʻleave itʼ option 
meant severe sanctions and air raids. This was best seen during the Dayton 
Peace Talks during which the negotiators were in kept semi-incarcerated 
conditions found in the Wright Patterson military base. Besides the inability 
to stall, these conditions did not allow  the sides to use statements made for 
the domestic media as a means of creating pressure on the international 
public. 
According to the agreement, the central government would control 
foreign affairs, citizenship, national currency, monetary and fiscal policies, 
finances, telecommunications, energy and infrastructure. Jurisdiction was to 
be divided between the central and local authorities in the areas of human 
rights, health care, environment, social policies, immigration and asylum, 
tourism, infrastructure and the use of natural resources. Canton jurisdiction 
would  cover the police, education, culture, public services, radio and so on. 
Besides this, the Federation of BiH should form a confederation with Croatia 
and enter into a customs and monetary union with it. The Washington 
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Agreement was signed on March 18,132 and its signing marked the start of the 
unitarization of BiH, considering the fact that the agreement did  not state 
that the cantons were bearers of sovereignty. Even though the treaty was 
signed, the Croatian areas remained under the rule of HR HB, and the 
Bosniak areas under the government in Sarajevo.133 The Washington 
agreement was in practice a military-political alliance designed by the USA 
to force the BiH Serbs to the negotiating table. It served its main purpose, but 
proved to be completely outdated by the end of the war. 
One of the primary tasks of the American ambassador in Croatia, Peter 
Galbraith, according to his own testimony, was to convince President 
Tuđman to stop supporting the BiH Croats under the threat of sanctions if he 
decided to continue his support. The abandonment of the HR HB was 
dependent on the liberation of the occupied territories of the Republic of 
Croatia and the promised aid of the USA concerning the establishment of 
stronger connections with the West. It seems that the crucial role in 
convincing Tuđman was played by foreign minister Mate Granić.134 The 
agreement itself was in fact a modification of the Action Plan of the EU, 
because the federation was basically meant to be comprised of the Croatian 
and Bosniak territories which was anticipated by the previous plan. Neither 
side was particularly satisfied with the agreement, but there was no more 
choice to make, except over details. 
 
Plans of the Contact Group for Croatia (Z-4) and BIH 
After the signing of the Zagreb Agreement on the cessation of fire between 
the RSK and Croatian authorities on March 30, a new round of negotiations 
began which included the USA, Russia, UN and EU, so that they became 
known as the – Z-4 (Zagreb Four Talks). According to the agreement, the 
delineation line was to be 2km long, while the treaty itself was understood by 
the Krajina Serbs as a chance to stabilize the RSK. After the signing, the UN 
mandate was prolonged which gave Serbs an extra feeling of security. Even 
though they did not acknowledge Croatian authority, the Serbs were 
demanding pension payments, which was partially agreed to by Croatia. 
Economic relations were also discussed, but prime minister Mikelić said that 
he needed the confirmation of the RSK Skupština which in practice meant 
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that it was a failure. The economic part of the deal was only signed  before 
the end of December through the direct telephone intervention of Slobodan 
Milošević.135 
The Contact Group was formed in April 1994, and consisted of Russia, 
the USA, and – as the representatives of the EU, UN and the International 
Conference on Former Yugoslavia – Germany, France and Great Britain. 
According to the plan for Croatia, named Z-4, Serbs were to be given broad 
autonomy with their own symbols, separate legislative bodies, a president 
and  ministry cabinet (government), a separate currency and a police force. 
At the request of the American ambassador Galbraith a meeting took place 
with Tuđman on September 12 1994, at which the ambassador proposed that 
two majority Serbian districts, Glina and Knin, linked via Slunj, should have 
some elements of statehood, while the rest of the occupied territories in 
Slavonia should be reintegrated into Croatia. The next meeting was held on 
October 10, at which Galbraith introduced an expanded version of the plan. 
According to this version, besides the above, it was suggested that the area of 
Serbian autonomy be called Krajina, and that it should have a president, a 
parliament and courts. There would be no border between Krajina and 
Croatia, and Krajina would have autonomy in the areas of education, culture, 
energy, tourism, trades, taxes and police. It would be allowed to sign state 
treaties in agreement with Zagreb, and in the area of autonomy it could also 
sign treaties with other Serbian states. The currency would be controlled by 
the Croatian National Bank, but Krajina could have its own banknotes. A 
separate constitutional court was to be established, consisting of two judges 
from Krajina, two from Croatia and three representatives of the international 
community. Krajina would enjoy the rights to its own flag and coat of arms. 
A precondition for acquiring Krajina citizenship was possession of Croatian 
citizenship. State borders with BiH would be controlled by the central 
government, while Krajina would be demilitarised within 5 years. 
Tuđman opposed  such a proposal, stating that he could agree to the 
cultural autonomy of the Serbs in Croatia, and territorial autonomy in the 
districts of Glina and Knin, but without the elements of statehood. In a 
meeting on January 30, 1995, Tuđman stated that he would consider the 
plan, which could be a starting point, but could not depart from the 
constitutional decrees of Croatia. The Krajina Serbs rejected the plan  
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claiming that it was made in agreement with the Croats at the expense of the 
Serbs, and on the same day they refused to receive an international 
delegation. Croatia was opposed mainly due to the possibility that Krajina 
could sign international agreements, thus providing it with subjectivity and a 
basis for potential separation from Croatia in the future. 
The rejection of the plan was one of the last acts which had shown that 
negotiations were not possible and that the occupied territories had to be 
returned to the state-legal framework of Croatia by military means. The 
uncompromising politics of the Krajina Serbs led to a situation where it was 
no longer possible to discuss arrangements of any kind or coexistence with 
Croatia, even though there  definitely were people in the leadership who 
understood that the plan was the best they could get. Prime minister of RSK 
Mikelić also rejected the Plan, which, considering his loyalty to Milošević, 
also meant that it was not agreeable to Belgrade. This proved to be true after 
the international representatives, who were not received by Krajina 
authorities, were also not welcomed in Belgrade the next day. This type of 
behaviour can primarily be interpreted by Miloševićʼs abandonment of the 
maximum Serbian demands for a Greater Serbia with the western borders of 
Virovitica–Karlovac–Karlobag and his desire to strengthen Serbian authority 
in east Bosnia. Besides, it was becoming clear that, due to international 
factors, Krajina would not be internationally recognised. Milošević could not 
publicly declare his rejection of the plan because he would have probably 
been accused of betraying national interests. Rather he ordered Knin to reject 
the plan and distanced himself from further political moves by the Krajina 
leadership.136 To Milošević, Krajina served as a means to blackmail Croatia 
in the negotiations over BiH.137 
 
The Plan of the Contact Group for BIH 
According to the plan of the Contact Group, BiH would be organised into 
two entities, the Federation of BiH and the RS as well as Sarajevo under the 
jurisdiction of the UN. Since 1994  Croatian-Bosniak cooperation had  led to 
the conquest of territories under Serbian rule. In the case of a Serbian 
rejection of the plan, threats were made to lift the arms embargo and impose 
stricter sanctions as well as to withdraw UNPROFOR. For the first time 
                                                          
136 Barić (2005): 474-80. 
137 Bing (2007): 391. 
Croatian Studies Review 9 (2013) 
61 
 
Milošević distanced himself from the politics of the BIH Serbs. The Contact 
Group did not officially withdraw after its failure and nor did it undertake 
some sort of action which would bring significant changes on the field.138 In 
July, the Group presented a map according to which the ratio between the 
Federation of BiH and the RS would be 51%:49%. The Bosniak side felt that 
the Federation should have 58%, but it agreed in principle, stating publicly 
its conviction that the Serbs would not agree, which soon turned out to be 
true. According to the suggested constitutional principles, the presidency was 
to consist of one member of all constitutive nations, and would change every 
four months. The parliament would make decisions upon the basis of a two-
thirds majority, which would have to include a simple majority of every 
nation. The American demands on lifting the arms embargo was heavily 
critized by the other members of the Group, who feared for their combat 
troops and threatened to withdraw them. As a counter-proposal they put 
forward the idea of stricter sanctions.139 
The different interests of the Groupʼs members proved to be too big of 
a problem when decisions had to be made on how to act after the Serbian 
rejection of the plan, that is, should the embargo be lifted (USA), await 
Serbian approval  (Russia) or tighten sanctions  (Germany, France and Great 
Britain). 
 
The Dayton Agreement 
In the autumn of 1994, the Bosniak side started a series of operations in the 
Bihać area, most probably encouraged by the Americans, for the purpose of 
sensitizing the global public and instigating operations against the Serbs 
which soon occured.  The autumn attack operations revealed the weakness of 
the ABiH which was winning territories, but was not capable of keeping 
them, resulting in Serbian re-conquests.140 The Croatian side undertook 
successful actions in the late autumn of 1994 in the Livno and Kupres areas. 
The Croatian actions were, among other causes, boosted because a part of the 
military intelligence structures from the Pentagon was in favour of halting 
the conflict based on the situation on the field in Croatia and BiH.141 
Contrary to the  expected, international attacks did not discourage the Serbs 
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who stopped UN movements and captured their observers. According to 
some opinions, the Serbs had intentionally provoked the intervention to gain 
legitimacy and to speed up the continuation of their operations. The USA 
demanded that NATO continue their offensive, which was against the 
opinion of all the NATO members which had troops in BiH. The former 
American President Jimmy Carter arranged a four-month truce with the BiH 
Serbs, which was activated on January 1, 1995. Tuđman threatened that he 
would not prolong the UNPROFOR mandate, which was to expire on March 
31, 1995, if the situation did not change. The UN mission was renamed  the 
UN Peace Force on March 31, and divided into UNCRO for Croatia, 
UNPROFOR for BIH and UNPREDEP for Macedonia. Whilst stressing the 
truce, all sides were preparing for the continuation of  combat which was to 
continue in April. 
On May 22, the Serbs captured an amunitions storehouse near 
Sarajevo, despite the ban on heavy weaponry. After the unfulfilled 48-hour 
ultimatum to return the captured munitions, NATO air raids followed. In 
retaliation, the Serbs struck Tuzla and killed 67 civilians as well as taking 
observers as hostages. General Rupert Smith sought the continuation of the 
air raids, but the command was refused. In June, Rapid Reaction Force 
(RRF) was founded on a French suggestion to secure UNPROFOR.142 The 
RRF was meant to be a mobile military formation prepared to perform 
offensive operations. To this day its role is not completely clear, but there are 
signs that the RRF formations were to serve as wedges for the stopping of 
further Croatian and Bosniak offensives against the Serbs, that is, to secure 
the interests of France, Great Britain and The Netherlands, which were the 
sole contributers to the RRF. 
Joint Croatian-Muslim forces managed to capture, from June to 
October, a significant amount of territory, including Bosansko Grahovo, 
Glamoč, Drvar, Jajce, Mrkonjić Grad and were stopped around Banja Luka 
to keep the power balance intact, that is, to prevent a total Serbian defeat. 
With the Serbs defeated, a completely new situation would emerge, and the 
international intention was the end of the conflict as soon as possible. The 
biggest problem would have been the complete change of the demographic 
structure of BiH in the case of a complete Serbian defeat. The loss of 
territory forced the previously unyielding Karadžić to seek help from 
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Milošević and to accept that Milošević was internationally representing the 
BiH Serbs.143 
In February 1994, Boutros Boutros-Ghali requested that NATO create 
a possible plan for the withdrawal of UNPROFOR from BiH. The 
withdrawal plan was named the Oplan 40104, and its seriousness was visible 
in the fact that it consisted of 1,300 pages of text and 24 appendices. 
According to the plan, 82,000 NATO troops were to be involved in the 
extraction of UNPROFOR, 25,000 of these to be contributed by the USA. 
Bearing in mind the American share, it is clear why they decided to solve the 
BiH conflict rapidly. The duration of the operation was to be 22 weeks, 
while the expense just for the United States would be over 700 million 
dollars. A significant problem in the operation was the mountainous terrain 
in BiH with poor and mined roads. The UNPROFOR withdrawal also raised  
humanitarian issues. The civil population would be left unprotected, and a 
massive immigration wave to Europe was at risk.144 Considering all of the 
risk-full situations, the USA forced the conflicting sides to accept a treaty, so 
as not to  risk the engagement of a large number of combat troops and  
financial expense which would have to be justified to the American public. 
The negotiations on the establishment of a permanent peace began on 
November 1 at the American military base Wright Patterson, Dayton, Ohio, 
after which the treaty was named. Negotiations lasted for three weeks, and 
one of the preconditions was the international recognition of BiH by Serbia. 
The delegations were separated during the meeting, and met only during 
bilateral meetings. There was no press or radio conferences so as to prevent 
the development of various interpretations and public pressure, although 
there was some leakage of information. For Croatia, it was agreed that the 
reintegration would last one year, with the possibility of extending it for one 
more year, if everything was not done in time. The Bosniak side managed to 
secure Sarajevo and the corridor to Goražde, which was the subject of 
numerous discussions. Milošević wanted a more narrow corridor, but gave 
up after he was shown on a computer that it was as narrow as possible. After 
the agreements were made, a problem occured concerning the fact that the 
Serbs got 45% of the territory, and not 49% as was predicted. This was 
solved by giving the Serbs Mrkonjić Grad, while the Bosniak side was given 
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arbitration for Brčko.145 
The Dayton peace agreement was signed on December 14 in Paris and 
consisted of 10 articles, 11 appendices and 102 maps. According to appendix 
1a146, a time and program was calculated for the separation of the conflicting 
sides and the redeployment of IFOR (Implementation Force) which had the 
task of implementing the peace. Its basic task was to protect the delineation 
line, and it numbered about 60,000 personnel. Besides the above, they were 
meant to be a ʻreminderʼ to the warring sides to exclude the possibility of 
further conflicts. The delineation line held by IFOR was 4 km wide.147 The 
number of personnel would have surely been higher if the progressive 
implementation had been agreed upon earlier, which would have raised the 
problem of finances. 
The official name of the country was no longer The Republic of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina, but Bosnia and Herzegovina. According to the BiH 
Constitution (appendix 4)148 in article III, point 1, the central institutions  
governed foreign affairs, foreign trade, customs, monetary policies (which 
was limited considering the fact that the governer of the central bank was 
chosen by the International Monetary Fund), the financing of institutions, 
international obligations of BiH, policies concerning immigration, refugees 
and asylum, international implementation of criminal law, implementation of 
entity rights, control over common resources, regulation of traffic between 
entities and air traffic control. The jurisdiction of the entities covered the 
functioning of human rights, making agreements with countries and 
international organisations, with the acceptance of the Parliament. According 
to article VI, the Parliament  consisted  of two houses: Dom naroda (House 
of the Peoples) and Zastupnički dom (House of the Representatives). Dom 
naroda had 15 delegates, five from each nation. Nine members were needed 
to reach a quorum, at least three from each nation. The Zastupnički dom  
consisted  of 42 representatives, with two thirds from the Federation and one 
third from RS. To reach a quorum a majority was needed. To proclaim any 
law the consent of both houses was required. Each nation had the right to 
veto in case its vital interests were endangered. In that case, the president of 
the Dom naroda had to immediatelly call a commission consisting of three 
                                                          
145 Gow (1997): 279-85. 
146 M. Tuđman (2005): 652-69. 
147 Gow (1997): 287. 
148 M. Tuđman (2005): 669-82. 
Croatian Studies Review 9 (2013) 
65 
 
representatives whose task would be to solve the issue within five days. In 
case of failure, the issue was forwarded to the Constitutional Court. 
Ministers and their deputies had to be of different nationalities in order 
to secure control. The coordination of civil implementation was given to the 
High Representative who was named by the Security Council. Foreign 
bodies included in governing were the human rights attorney named by the 
OSCE (Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe), the central 
bank governer who was named by the International Monetary Fund with a 
six year mandate and three of nine  members of the Constitutional Court 
were to be named by the President of the European Human Rights Court. 
 
A security guarantee or a cause of instability? 
The Dayton Agreement established the paradoxal formulation of ‘two 
entitites and three nations’. The Serbian nation has its own entity through 
which it achieves its sovereign rights, and has the future possibility of 
exercising its legitimate right of self-determination, which is a common topic 
to this day. The Bosniak elites consider the Federation primarily as their own 
national unit in which supremacy is achieved through a numerical majority, 
including in the system a few Croats without legitimacy to create an illusion 
of legality. The ethnic division which was mostly opposed by the Bosniak 
leadership continued to be visible and has even deepened further. Creating 
this order was used by the USA as a guarantee of avoiding the deployment of 
a large number of combat troops and avoiding financial expense in the case 
of a further armed conflict. The role of Croats and Serbs in BiH was to 
prevent the development of radical Islam in Europe, which was feared by the 
West. The Croats would thus control government at the  level of entities and 
the Serbs at the state level. It is worth mentioning Karadžić's recorded 
statement from May 1992: 
 
“Europe wonʼt and doesnʼt want to accept the risk of 
letting a Muslim state be organised here. This is our 
biggest problem. They want us to stay united with the 
Croats in a single state of Bosnia in order to control the 
Muslims.”149 
 
This kind of BiH was (and remains) sustainable only because of the 
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international protectorate and financing. BiH is unable to function 
independently which is visible in the role of the High Representative as an 
independent sovereign who can stop any decision, which means that BiH is a 
country of limited sovereignty or a quasi-state.150 The BiH elites wish to 
retain their economic and social power, which they try to achieve by 
preserving the current state of the country's division and isolation.151 
The prewar ‘sacrificing peace for a sovereign Bosnia’ failed and 
resulted in the ‘sovereign Bosnia being sacrificed for peace’,  handing over a 
crucial part of its sovereignty to the High Representative in the process. The 
Bosniak elites have remained somewhat satisfied by sacrificing sovereignty 
to the international community in exchange for dominating the Federation. 
The question remains whether BiH will be able to transform itself into a 
functioning state and how long will the international community be prepared 
to finance the current state. 
 
The Erdut Agreement 
After the return of the territories of Krajina and west Slavonia  to the state-
legal framework of Croatia, the American President Bill Clinton stated that 
the problem of occupied territories in east Slavonia had to be solved within 
the framework of a solution to the conflict in BiH. The task of renewing 
contacts with the Serbs in the Danube basin was given to the American 
ambassador Galbraith and to the UNʼs ambassador Stoltenberg. The 
meetings between the representatives of the international community and the 
Serbian leadership were held during September and October in 1995 in 
Erdut. As a starting point for a solution the Z-4 Plan was suggested, but the 
situation changed significantly when the political autonomy of Serbs who 
formed the majority in those areas before the war was called into question. 
The Croatian delegation responded to the international mediators by noting 
that the Serbs had not formed a majority in any municipality in any prewar 
census and that military action was not excluded. In early October, the 
Croatian and Serbian delegations in Erdut managed to agree to the 
acceptance of eleven agreement articles on solving the conflict. The question 
of Croatian Podunavlje was meant to be solved before the start of the Dayton 
negotiations, but this was rejected by Milošević so that he could negotiate in 
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case  the talks somehow turned in an unexpected direction. One of the 
reasons for finding a  quick solution was the artillery bombardment of 
Croatian areas from the territory of the BiH Serbs.152 In considering the 
implementation of a  military operation a large number of military victims 
was predicted, as well as the possible interference of the Army of Yugoslavia 
and the bombings of Croatian cities, which resulted in the plan being 
rejected. 
At the request of the Croatian delegation in Dayton, on November 2, 
the question of the reintegration of the Croatian Podunavlje was raised, and 
both sides agreed to it on November 11. Opinions differed on the question of 
the duration of the UN mandate in the transitional period. Finally it was 
agreed that the UN mandate would last one year with the possibility of it 
being extended for one more year in case  one of the parties sought an 
extension. After reaching the agreement, Galbraith and Stoltenberg travelled 
to  the signing of the treaty in Erdut which occured the next day. Hrvoje 
Šarinić signed the treaty on behalf of the Croatian government, and Milan 
Milanović on behalf of the Serbian. According to the agreement, the territory 
was to be under UN administration for a period of between  one to two years. 
The basic task of the UN was to organize a multinational police force, 
organize local elections and conduct demilitarization. The agreement was 
fulfilled in early 1998, which resulted in the establishment of the total 
territorial sovereignty of the Republic of Croatia.153 
 
Conclusion 
The calling of the first democratic elections in Yugoslavia with the 
encouragement of the international community, especially of its European 
part, for the purpose of democratization and transformation to a market 
economy, led, in the eyes of the international community, to the unexpected 
collapse of Yugoslavia. 
International mediation during the war in the area of the former 
Yugoslavia, observed in detail through the proposed peace plans, highlighted 
a lack of consensus between the main members in key issues regarding the 
prevention and conclusion of the war. Besides, it also highlighted the 
weakness of the European part of the international community in imposing 
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its own solutions due to the lack of military capacity. The USA as a global 
superpower had the potential to control the development of the war, refusing 
to send combat troops which were requested by Europe and the UN to 
implement a peace process. By establishing the Vance Plan in Croatia, the 
infirmity of international peace mediations via the UNPA zones was 
revealed, since they were unable to complete their primary mission – 
demilitarization, establishment of civil life and the return of  refugees. 
The war ended relatively shortly after the active involvement of the 
USA in early 1994. American diplomacy was led by the simple principle of 
forcing peace under physical threats of military force, in which the 
conflicting sides were left merely with the details during negotiations. It is 
interesting to note two completely different principles in relation to ending 
the conflict, which could be interpreted primarily as diplomatic experiments 
of the USA. Even though BiH and Croatia were structurally completely 
different countries, in Croatia the war ended with  peaceful reintegration, and 
in BiH with a freezing of conditions on the field. To put it simply, in BiH 
Serbian territorial conquests were recognised, which was not the case for 
Croatia. One could presume that the United States intentionally arranged this 
in order to see the advantages and disadvantages of both principles in 
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U radu se daje prikaz rata koji se vodio na prostoru bivše Jugoslavije s 
posebnim naglaskom na mirovne planove međunarodne zajednice. 
Preispituje se svrha i učinkovitost međunarodne diplomacije te uloga 
Republike Hrvatske i Bosne i Hercegovine u novim geopolitičkim 
odnosima nastalima nakon pada komunizma.Osim navedenoga, daju 
se odgovori na pitanja što je uzrokovalo sukob, je li sukob mogao biti 
spriječen te ratni ciljevi zaraćenih strana. Nadalje, autor ističe 
suprotstavljene interese glavnih aktera u međunarodnoj zajednici te 
vojnu nemogućnost europskog dijela međunarodne zajednice da 
implementira mir. Konačno, rad se bavi promjenom vanjske politike 
Sjedinjenih Američkih Država prema ratu u bivšoj Jugoslaviji od 
nezainteresiranosti do aktivne politike okončanja rata pod svaku 
cijenu.
